*Many many good cards in this article*
Madalene O’Donnell, program coordinator at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, Draft chapter prepared for Civil War and the Rule of Law, 2006, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/corruption_conflict_and_rule_of_law.pdf
Pressure on the part of donors and the public to address corruption can have unintended effects
Deepa Ollapally, Program Officer, Special Initiative on the Muslim World, US Institute of Peace, USIP Special Report No. 105, April 2003, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.html
Opinion among the participants was split about the best way to deal
New York Times, August 28, 1999
''I'm an economist -- I focus on what can be done, not moral rearmament
Taking on corruption provokes a violent backlash
Mark Sedra, research associate at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and Dr. Peter Middlebrook, independent consultant who has been working in Afghanistan since early 2002, Foreign Policy in Focus, November 2, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2912
The accommodationist approach, endorsed by the United States , is characterized
*Corruption is key to limit conflict. Economic and political opportunity for powerful insurgents is a key safety valve to contain violence
Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Journal of International Development, 15, 413-426, abstract, 2003, http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/corruption.pdf
According to the ‘corruption buys peace’ argument, corruption facilitates the creation of a political
[many other cards in this article]
**Cracking down on warlords causes regime collapse and nationwide chaos
Colonel Vincent Dreyer, “Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College, February 28, 2006
Other critics agree with the end state of Afghan nation-building but advocate changes
Cracking down on militias reduces stability – it removes their stake in peace
Dr. Sean Maloney, teaches in the Royal Military College War Studies Programme, “Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment,” Parameters, Autumn 2005
Militia forces are leadership-dependent. The main issue in this
Integration of the Northern Alliance is the only thing holding Afghanistan together
Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 2, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/administrations-iran-drug-policies.html
There has been much speculation about how Iran would respond, mostly
Iran misperceives the crackdown as encirclement, risking miscalc
Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 11, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/collapse-of-legitimacy-in-pakistan.html
The status of those Taliban leaders branded by the U.S. as harborers of al-Qaida
7/19 cites
Empowering the police increases insecurity
Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007, http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html The historical role of police in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas, has been very limited. Their main task
Public perception of corruption makes all their impacts inevitable, even if they result in a substantial overall reduction UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf
Available data on perceptions and anecdotal evidence indicate that corruption is seen to be very widespread,
Anti-corruption efforts fail – too deeply ingrained UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf Anti-corruption agencies can fail because of: • Weak political will – vested interests and other pressing
Lack of judicial reform makes police reform useless
Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007, http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective
Cracking down on corruption causes warlord backlash, destroying security Time, March 8, 2004
The Karzai government has attempted to rein in recalcitrant warlords. Most recently Karzai appointed
Rising expectations turn the case – setting anti-corruption goals too high results in disillusionment UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf Another serious issue is the combination of high expectations and widespread cynicism and doubts about the
Corruption guarantees total state collapse
Arthur Kent, BBC correspondent for Afghanistan since 1980, Jul./Aug. 2007. [Policy Options, Covering Up Karzai & Co., p. http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul07/kent.pdf]
Abdul Rab’s tale might seem grim enough if Minister Zarar were just a small-time hood, using local cronies
7/20 cites
*Many many good cards in this article*Madalene O’Donnell, program coordinator at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, Draft chapter prepared for Civil War and the Rule of Law, 2006, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/corruption_conflict_and_rule_of_law.pdf
Pressure on the part of donors and the public to address corruption can have unintended effects
Deepa Ollapally, Program Officer, Special Initiative on the Muslim World, US Institute of Peace, USIP Special Report No. 105, April 2003, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.html
Opinion among the participants was split about the best way to deal
M K Bhadrakumar, diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for 29 years, Asia Times, 2-6-08, http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB06Df01.html
New York Times, August 28, 1999
''I'm an economist -- I focus on what can be done, not moral rearmament
Taking on corruption provokes a violent backlash
Mark Sedra, research associate at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and Dr. Peter Middlebrook, independent consultant who has been working in Afghanistan since early 2002, Foreign Policy in Focus, November 2, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2912
The accommodationist approach, endorsed by the United States , is characterized
Demands for corruption reform collapse NATO – ensures perception of imperialist occupation
Adrian Hamilton, The Independent, 2-8-08, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/adrian-hamilton/adrian-hamilton-nato-should-not-be-fighting-this-war-in-afghanistan-779753.html
That is not the same question, although inextricably linked, with the question of whether
*Corruption is key to limit conflict. Economic and political opportunity for powerful insurgents is a key safety valve to contain violence
Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Journal of International Development, 15, 413-426, abstract, 2003, http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/corruption.pdf
According to the ‘corruption buys peace’ argument, corruption facilitates the creation of a political
[many other cards in this article]
Empirical results prove corruption doesn’t hurt growth
Fred Oluoch, April 13, 2005, http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_10229.html
In his opposition to the much-touted growth model where developing countries
Appeasement of warlords is key to Karzai – pressure on corruption threatens the state
William Arkin, Policy Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, 2-28-08, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2008/02/why_a_surge_isnt_right_for_afg.html
On the other hand, the figure should not be surprising to anyone who has been paying
The aff leads to PMC shift
Carl Robichaud, program officer at the Century Foundation, World Politics Review, October 30, 2007, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/8951B04F55F156218725738400709B1A?OpenDocument
"If you don't have enough military forces, very
**Cracking down on warlords causes regime collapse and nationwide chaos
Colonel Vincent Dreyer, “Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College, February 28, 2006
Other critics agree with the end state of Afghan nation-building but advocate changes
Cracking down on militias reduces stability – it removes their stake in peace
Dr. Sean Maloney, teaches in the Royal Military College War Studies Programme, “Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment,” Parameters, Autumn 2005
Militia forces are leadership-dependent. The main issue in this
Integration of the Northern Alliance is the only thing holding Afghanistan together
Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 2, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/administrations-iran-drug-policies.html
There has been much speculation about how Iran would respond, mostly
Iran misperceives the crackdown as encirclement, risking miscalc
Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 11, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/collapse-of-legitimacy-in-pakistan.html
The status of those Taliban leaders branded by the U.S. as harborers of al-Qaida
7/19 cites
Empowering the police increases insecurityAndrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007, http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html
The historical role of police in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas, has been very limited. Their main task
Public perception of corruption makes all their impacts inevitable, even if they result in a substantial overall reduction
UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf
Available data on perceptions and anecdotal evidence indicate that corruption is seen to be very widespread,
Anti-corruption efforts fail – too deeply ingrained
UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf
Anti-corruption agencies can fail because of: • Weak political will – vested interests and other pressing
Lack of judicial reform makes police reform useless
Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007, http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html
The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective
Cracking down on corruption causes warlord backlash, destroying security
Time, March 8, 2004
The Karzai government has attempted to rein in recalcitrant warlords. Most recently Karzai appointed
Rising expectations turn the case – setting anti-corruption goals too high results in disillusionment
UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf
Another serious issue is the combination of high expectations and widespread cynicism and doubts about the
Corruption guarantees total state collapse
Arthur Kent, BBC correspondent for Afghanistan since 1980, Jul./Aug. 2007. [Policy Options, Covering Up Karzai & Co., p. http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul07/kent.pdf]
Abdul Rab’s tale might seem grim enough if Minister Zarar were just a small-time hood, using local cronies